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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The large current account deficit in the U.S. and the large current account surplus in 
Japan have continued during the past three decades (see Figure 1), and the large bilateral trade 
deficit of the U.S. with Japan has also persisted (see Figure 2). The conventional intertemporal 
approach  to  the  current  account  can  not  explain  these  persisting  large  current  account 
imbalances  as  Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  (1995)  argue,  and  thus  it  needs  the  help  of 
overlapping-generations  variants  of  the  intertemporal  models.  The  overlapping-generations 
variants  of  the  intertemporal  models  explain  persistent  current  account  imbalances  by 
heterogeneous demographic changes. For example, they explain that more rapidly aging Japan 
experiences  persisting  current  account  surpluses  while  less  rapidly  aging  US  experiences 
persisting current account deficits. There are voluminous works that conduct simulations based 
on the overlapping-generations variants of the intertemporal models and project the impacts of 
heterogeneous demographic changes in the U.S., Japan and other countries.
1  Although there are 
various types of models, the basic idea behind the explanation of persisting current account 
imbalances is common and simple: national savings moves heterogeneously under the influence 
of  heterogeneous  demographic  changes  while  national  investments  are  affected  less  by  the 
heterogeneous demographic changes because they are determined basically by the world real 
interest rate, and thus heterogeneous demographic changes generate heterogeneous movements 
of the balance on current account, i.e., heterogeneous movements of national savings minus 
national investments. 
However,  although  theoretical  projections  based  on  demographic  changes  have  been 
numerously carried out, few systematic empirical examinations into the relationship between the 
                                                           
1  See e.g. Kotlikoff, Smetters and Walliser (2001), Brooks (2003), or Faruqee (2003). Most of these simulations 
project that the current account in Japan will turn to deficits in near future due to the rapid demographical change in 
Japan.   2 
balance on current account and demographic changes have reported. Among these few studies, 
Poterba (2001) conclude that although theoretical models generally suggest that equilibrium 
returns on financial assets will vary in response to changes in population age structure, it is 
difficult to find robust evidence of such relationships in the time series data. As a result, the 
conjecture  that  current  account  imbalances  are  generated  by  heterogeneous  demographic 
changes has not been fully supported by empirical evidence and is still merely a theoretical 
possibility.  If  explanations  based  on  heterogeneous  demographic  changes  indicate  only  a 
theoretical possibility, heterogeneity that can be examined as the source of persistent current 
account imbalances may not necessarily be limited only to the heterogeneity of demographic 
changes. Other heterogeneous nature of economies may also theoretically generate discrepancy 
between national savings and investments.   
The paper explores heterogeneity in degree of risk aversion as another possible source of 
persistent current account  imbalances. The reason why the paper directs its attention to the 
degree of risk aversion is firstly that in endogenous growth models the degree of relative risk 
aversion plays a crucial role for growth rates and thus its heterogeneity significantly complicates 
movements of international transactions. Assume that there are only two countries in the world, 
only difference between which is the degree of relative risk aversion. The conventional growth 
models  with  exogenous  technologies,  the  heterogeneous  degrees  of  risk  aversion  in  two 
countries  do  not  matter  for  steady  state  growth  rates  because  they  are  determined  by  the 
common exogenous growth rate of technologies in both countries. However, in endogenous 
growth models, the degree of relative risk aversion is the crucial parameter that determines 
growth rates, and thus steady state growth paths under its heterogeneity are not so simple. The 
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is consumption per capita,      is capital inputs per capita,    is outputs,    is capital inputs,    is 
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=   is the growth rate of population,   is the 
rate of time preference,   is the degree of relative risk aversion, and   is a constant. In most 




    is  modeled  to  be  constant,  and  thus  the  growth  rate  of 
consumption becomes constant.
2  Hence, in endogenous growth models, the constant growth 
rate  of  consumption 
( )
 





















&   crucially  depends  on  the  value  of  degree  of 
relative risk aversion  , and thus its heterogeneity significantly complicates steady state growth 
paths in the world of free trade. 
The  second  reason  why  the  paper  directs  its  attention  to  the  degree  of  relative  risk 
aversion is because it has been reported that the degree of relative risk aversion in Japan is 
relatively higher than that in the U.S. It is another important heterogeneity than demographic 
changes between the U.S. and Japan, and it implies a possibility that the large current account 
deficits in the U.S. and the large current account surpluses in Japan can be explained by the 
relatively higher degree of relative risk aversion in Japan than that in the U.S. In the well-known 
Szpiro (1986), it is reported that of the nine industrialized countries studied the Japanese have 
the highest degree of relative risk aversion, e.g. the degree of relative risk aversion in Japan is 
2.76 while that in the U.S. is 1.19. It is a well known fact that compared with households in the 
U.S., households in Japan invest their financial assets much less in risky investments, which 
clearly indicates that the degree of risk aversion in Japan is much higher than that in the U.S. 
Furthermore,  heterogeneity  in  risk  aversive  behavior  has  recently  been  reported  from  the 
medical or genetical point of view. Ono et al. (1997) and Nakamura et al. (1997) show that the 
                                                           
2  See e.g. Romer (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1998), or Jones (2003).     4 
genetic composition of the receptor for brain chemicals such as serotonin or dopamine differs 
widely among human races, and that most Japanese have inherited a certain type of receptor 
composition that produces more cautious and therefore more risk aversive characteristics, while 
many Americans have inherited the other type that produces less risk aversive characteristics. In 
addition, Harashima (1998) shows that the so-called “Japanese economic system” or “Japanese 
capitalism” originates in the higher degree of relative risk aversion in the Japanese.   
The model in the paper, which is based on the solution in Sorger (2002) and Ghiglino 
(2002) to the problem of heterogeneous households raised by Becker (1980), shows that there is 
a possibility that heterogeneity in degree of relative risk aversion generates persistent, more 
correctly permanent, current account imbalances. In some circumstances, a country with lower 
degree of relative risk aversion experiences a permanent current account deficit, and in reverse a 
country with higher degree of relative risk aversion experiences a permanent current account 
surplus. Nevertheless, current account deficits and surpluses do not explode but the ratio of 
deficit and surplus to output asymptotically approach unique finite values and stabilize in both 
countries. Hence, the model predicts that if the degree of relative risk aversion in Japan is truly 
relatively higher than that in the U.S., there is a possibility that the current account surplus 
persists in Japan permanently and the current account deficit persists in the U.S. permanently.   
          The paper is organized as follows. In section II, a two-country endogenous growth model 
that incorporates international transactions is constructed, and the basic nature of the model is 
examined. It is shown that there is a steady state growth path on which the limits of growth rates 
of consumption, capital, knowledge/technology/idea, and output are all equal and they are equal 
in both countries. In section III, the balance on current account in the model is examined. It is 
shown  that  there  is  a  possibility  that  a  country  with  lower  degree  of  relative  risk  aversion 
experiences a permanent current account deficit and in reverse a country with higher degree of 
relative  risk  aversion  experiences  a  permanent  current  account  surplus.  In  section  IV,  first, 
evidence that the degree of relative risk aversion in Japan is relatively higher than that in the   5 
U.S. is presented. Secondly simple simulations with calibrated parameter values are carried out, 
results of which indicate a possibility of permanent trade imbalance. Finally, some concluding 
remarks are offered in section V. 
 
II. THE MODEL 
 
1. The basic model 





























    is kept constant by some mechanisms that 
are different according to the type of models, and thus in most models, the degree of relative 
risk aversion plays a crucial role for steady state growth rates. In this sense, many types of 
endogenous growth models that incorporate international transactions may be used for the sake 
of  the  analysis  in  the  paper  and  may  lead  to  the  same  conclusions.  From  among  various 
endogenous growth models, however, the paper chooses a specific model that is examined in 
Harashima (2004), because this model has the advantage of being free from scale effects and the 
influence of population growth simultaneously, which seems very advantageous when a factor 
other than demographic changes is examined since we can extract the effect of the factor that 
are independent from effects of population.
3 
          The production function is assumed to be  ( )                   , , = , where    (≥ 0) is outputs,    
(≥ 0) is capital inputs,    (≥ 0) is labor inputs, and    (≥ 0) is knowledge/technology/idea inputs 
in period  . The model is based on the following assumptions.   
 
Assumption:   
                                                           
3  See e.g. Jones (1995), Aghion and Howitt (1998), and Peretto and Smulders (2002).   6 
(A1)  Accumulations  of  capital  and  knowledge/technology/idea  are                         − − − = & & , 
where  ( ) 0 >     is a constant and a unit of    and 
 
1   of a unit of    are produced using the same 
amounts of inputs, and      is the rate of depreciation.
4 






   
where    is the number of firms and  ( ) 1 >     is a constant. 
(A3) 
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∂ 1 .   
 
Assumption (A1)  is standard one  in the  literature  of  endogenous  growth. Assumption (A2) 
simply assumes that the number of population and the number of firms in an economy  are 
positively related, which seems intuitively natural. In assumption (A3), the paper assumes that 
returns on investing in    and investing in    for a firm are kept equal. However it is also 
assumed in (A3) that a firm that invents a new technology can not obtain all the returns on 
investing in   . This means that investing in    increases    but returns of an individual firm that 
invests in    is only a fraction of the increase of    such that 
( ) ( )  
 
   
 
 
    
 






∂ 1 1 . The 
reason  why  only  a  fraction  of  the  increase  in      the  returns  of  an  individual  firm  is,  is 
uncompensated knowledge spillovers to other firms.     
          More specifically, the production function is assumed to have the following functional 
form:  ( ) ( )    
 
                               = = , where  ( ) 1 0 < <       is a constant. Let 
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=   and  assume  that  ( )           ,   is  homogenous  of  degree  one.  Thereby 
                                                           
4  Hence, like Jones’ (1995) non-scale model,   , as well as   , is produced less as    and    increase if the usual 
production function of homogeneous of degree one is assumed.   7 
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2. The model in open economies 
          For simplicity, it is assumed that in the world there are only two countries, i.e., country 1 
and country 2, in which parameters as well as population are identical except the degrees of 
relative risk aversion, and the growth rate of population is zero, i.e.,  0 =     . Let the degree of 
relative  risk  aversion  in  the  country  1  be  1     and  that  in  the  country  2  be  2   .  Goods  and 
services and capital are freely traded but labor is immobilized in each country.     
          The production function in the country 1 is  ( )  
 
            1 1 = , and that in the country 2 is 
( )  
 
            2 2 =   where     is outputs,     is capital inputs  ( ) 2 , 1 =     in each country. In the paper, 




          
− =
1   and  thus 
( ) ( ) 2 , 1
1 = =
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        is examined.
5 
          Here,  since  both  countries  are  free  open  economies,  returns  on  investments  in  both 










   













∂ .   
An increase in    enhances outputs in both countries because of knowledge spillovers and thus 
returns  on  investing  in      is  described  as  ( )
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+ ∂ 2 1 1 .  Thereby,  ( ) ( ) [ ]
( )  
   
        







                                                           
5  As  is  well  known,  only  Harrod  neutral technological  progress  matches the  stylized facts  presented  by  Kaldor 
(1961).   8 
( ) ( ) [ ]
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= . Because this equation is always held through international arbitration, the 
following  equations  are  also  held:          2 1 = ,          2 1 =   and          2 1 & & = .  Hence,  ( )
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          Here, the balance of payments is introduced in the model. The balance on current account 
in  the  country  1  is        and  the  balance  on  current  account  in  the  country  2  is      − .  The 
sequence  of        is  determined  by  the  interaction  of  strategic  behavior  of  both  countries’ 
households as Ghiglino (2002) and Sorger (2002) argue and thus each country can not control 
the sequence of        independently. How the sequence of        is determined is explained later. 
          The optimization problem in the country 1 is; 
Max  ( ) ( )              − ∫
∞
exp











      
 
   
          
 
 

















and the optimization problem in the country 2 is; 
Max  ( ) ( )              − ∫
∞
exp











      
 
   
          
 
 
















& ,     
where    ( ) 2 , 1 =     is the utility function in each country,    is the population, and       & ( ) 2 , 1 =     is 
the increase of    by R&D in each country and              2 1 & & & + = . The accumulated current account 
balance      
 
  ∫0
  mirrors international capital flows due to current account imbalances, i.e. a   9 
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2   is the 



















1   is the balance on 
goods and services in the country 2. Equations (1) and (2) implicitly assume that at   = 0 each 
country does not have any foreign asset.   
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          Therefore the optimization problem in the economy 1 can be rewritten as   
  Max ( ) ( )              − ∫
∞
exp
0 1 1 0 , 
subject to 
( )




















































              
  
 
     
  
 
      
    







1 & .   
Let Hamiltonian  1 be 
( ) ( ) ( )
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where     1   is a costate variable, thus the optimality conditions for the economy 1 are   
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1 & , 
(6)  0 lim 1 1 =
∞ →           . 
          Similarly, let Hamiltonian  2 be 
( ) ( ) ( )
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exp λ θ  
where     2 is a costate variable, thus the optimality conditions for the economy 2 are   
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(8) 
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1 & , 
(10)  0 lim 2 2 =
∞ →           . 
 
          Since the problem of scale effects in endogenous growth model is not a focal point in the 








      
    
 
    in the 
following sections. Hence, by the optimality conditions (3), (4) and (5), and by the optimality 
conditions (7), (8) and (9), the growth rates of consumption are 
(11) 
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3. The basic nature of the model 
          Before examining the balance of current account in the model, the basic nature of the 
model is investigated. The most important point that must be made clear beforehand is whether 
the model is an endogenous growth model that can achieve steady state growth paths and if it is 
such a model, in what condition steady state growth paths are achieved. To begin with, the 
transversality conditions are examined.   
 
Lemma  1:  The  transversality  conditions  (6)  0 lim 1 1 =
∞ →             and  (10)  0 lim 2 2 =
∞ →             are  not   12 
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Proof: See Appendix 1. 
 
          Using lemma 1, an important nature of the model that the only growth path that satisfies 



























1 lim lim lim lim
& & & &
∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → = = = = constant 
is proved in the following lemma. 
 



























1 lim lim lim lim
& & & &
∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → = = = =  constant,  all  the  optimality 
conditions are satisfied. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 2. 
 
          Taking lemma 2 into consideration, it is highly likely that rational households behave so 



























1 lim lim lim lim
& & & &
∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → = = = = constant.   
However,  we  must  consider,  beforehand,  how  the  sequence  of        is  determined.  In  the 
well-known paper of Becker (1980), it is proved that if households are purely price takers, the 
most patient household owns all wealth in the conventional Ramsey models if households have 
heterogeneous rates  of time preference. Ghiglino (2002) predicts that it is likely that under   13 
appropriate assumptions the results in Becker (1980) still hold in endogenous growth models.   
Farmer and Lahiri (2004) show that in general, balanced growth equilibria do not exist in a 
multi-agent economy except for the special case where all agents have the same constant rate of 
time preference. The above results in the case of heterogeneous rates of time preference rate 
may hold in the case of heterogeneous degree of relative risk aversion.   
 
Proposition 1: If each country sets        without regarding the other countries optimality, then if 



















∞ → = = , all the optimality conditions for the representative households in 
the country 2 can be satisfied simultaneously.   
 
Proof: See Appendix 3. 
 
          Proposition 1 may provide a possibility that the country 2 can escape the constraint of 



















∞ → = =   is satisfied. However, it is extremely difficult that 
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& . Only 
in  extremely  lucky  cases  with  the  combination  of  exogenous  parameters  that  satisfies  the 
knife-edge  condition  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) 0 1 1 1 1
2
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  & &
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2
2   is 
satisfied, which will be exceedingly rare. As a result, proposition 1 contends that virtually all the 
optimality conditions for the representative households in the country 2 can not be satisfied 
simultaneously. This result corresponds to the well-known result in case of Ramsey models with   14 
exogenous technologies and heterogeneous households shown in Becker (1980). 
      However, Sorger (2002) shows that in the case where a government levies a progressive 
income tax, or in the case where there are few households of each type and thus they are not 
simple price takers but play a Nash equilibrium, the results shown in Becker (1980) do not hold 
anymore. Ghiglino (2002) argues that the latter case in Sorger (2002) can be interpreted as a 
model of international trade with a common market simply by associating each household’s 
type to a country with a national central planner or a representative household.   
Based  on  the  arguments  in  Sorger  (2002)  and  Ghiglino  (2002),  in  the  model  of  two 
non-small countries with heterogeneous households in the paper, it is possible to assume that 
each  representative  household in  two  countries  play  a  Nash  equilibrium  with  regard  to  the 
sequence of        in the optimization problems described in the previous sub-section. Because, by 



























1 lim lim lim lim
& & & &
∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → = = = =  constant  all  the  optimality 
conditions in each country are satisfied, which is a condition for a Nash equilibrium, then it is at 
least possible to assume the following behavior of households.   
 
Assumption:  For  the  initial  capital  stocks  20 10     =   and  knowledge/technology/idea   0, 
households in both countries select a sequence of        and set the initial consumptions so as to 
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∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → = = = = constant, while firms in both countries adjust    so as to 










   
















                                                           
6  Because 
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If  households  in  both  countries  behave  according  to  the  above  assumption,  achieved 
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1 = constant. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 4. 
 
Because     will  not  decrease,  in  the  paper  only  the  case  such  that 
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  & & & & & & &   is examined. Therefore, it is 
assumed that  ( ) 0 1
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, which means that the rate of return on capital exceeds 
the rate of time preference plus the growth rate of population and is quite natural economically. 
 
III. THE TRADE BALANCE 
 
In this section, the balance on international transactions in the model is examined. Since 
trade imbalances will grow infinitely, what should be disclosed firstly is whether their ratios to 
output explodes or stabilizes. This question is answered by the following corollary. 
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=  a 
positive constant. 
   16 
Proof: See Appendix 5. 
 
Because current account imbalances grow at the same rate with output, consumption, or capital 
eventually, the ratio of the balance on current account to output do not explode but stabilizes, 
i.e., it approaches to a unique finite value.   
          Corollary 1 shows that one country experiences a permanent current deficit and the other 
country experiences a permanent current account surplus. The next natural question is which 
country  experience  current  account  deficits  and  which  country  experience  current  account 
surpluses; the country with lower degree of relative risk aversion or the other. This question is 
answered by the following proposition 3. 
 
Proposition  3:  If  2 1 1     < ≤   and  other  parameters  are  equal,  then  if 
( ) ( )  
   
 
  
     


























2 1 2 1 ,  the  country  1  experiences  a  permanent 
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lim
τ   a negative constant, and the country 2 experiences 
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lim
τ   a positive constant. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 6.   
 
Proposition 3 indicates that, in some circumstances, the country with lower degree of 
relative risk aversion will experience a permanent current account deficit, and in reverse the 
country with higher degree of relative risk aversion will experience a permanent current account 
surplus. Because in general  ( )    
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1 1
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− −   and  the  coefficient  of     is 
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2 1 2 1 ,  then  in  the  reasonable  range  of    ,  the 
larger  1 and  2 are, the more easily the condition will be satisfied. 
It should be noted that proposition 3 needs the supplementary condition such that    ≥ 1 
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. It is shown more correctly in the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 2: If  2 1 1     < ≤   and other parameters are equal, then if 
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Proof: See Appendix 7. 
 
Next, the balance on goods and services is examined.   
 
Corollary 3: If  2 1 1     < ≤ and other parameters  are  equal, then the country 1 experiences a 








   




































   


























= a negative constant. 
 
Proof: See Appendix 8. 
 
          The reason of this result is because there is difference between the return on  ∫
 
     
0
, i.e., 
( )    
  







 − 1 1
2   and the growth rate of      .




1. The degree of risk aversion 
          As was mentioned in introduction, during the last three decades, the U.S. has experienced 
persisting  current  account  deficits  and  in  contrast  Japan  has  experienced  persisting  current 
account surpluses. Since the U.S. economy is the world’s largest and the Japanese economy is 
the second largest, the model in the paper will be applied well to the international transactions 
between the U.S. and Japan. The model in the paper predicts that, in some circumstances, if the 
degree of relative risk aversion in Japan is higher than that in the U.S., the U.S. will experience 
a  permanent  current  account deficit  and  Japan  will experience  a  permanent  current  account 
surplus.   
                                                           
7  Although eventually a country with relatively lower degree of relative risk aversion experiences trade surpluses as 
corollary 3 shows, it is easily understood by the proof of corollary 3 that, if the conditions in proposition 3 are 
satisfied, in reverse a country with relatively lower degree of relative risk aversion experiences trade deficits and a 
country with relatively higher degree of relative risk aversion experiences trade surpluses in early transition periods 










& .   19 
Are the Japanese really more risk aversive than people in the U.S.?    In the well-known 
Szpiro (1986) that carried out a comprehensive estimation of degrees of relative risk aversion 
around the world, of the nine industrialized countries studied the Japanese have the highest 
degree of relative risk aversion. Szpiro (1986) reports that the degree of relative risk aversion in 
Japan is 2.76 while that in the U.S. is 1.19, i.e., the degree of relative risk aversion in Japan is 
double that in the U.S.
8  It is a well known fact that compared with households in the U.S. the 
Japanese invest their financial assets less in risky investments, which clearly indicates that the 
degree  of  risk  aversion  in  Japan  is  much  higher  than  that  in  the  U.S.
9  With  these  data, 
Nakagawa and Shimizu (1999) concludes that the degree of relative risk aversion in Japan is 
two or three times higher than that in the U.S. Although there are various estimates of the 
degree of relative risk aversion in the U.S. and Japan and thus their absolute values are still 
inconclusive
10, the results in Szpiro (1986) or Nakagawa and Shimizu (1999) at least indicate 
that if the same estimation method is used in both countries, the estimate of the degree of 
relative risk aversion in Japan will be relatively higher than that in the U.S.   
          Furthermore, there is indirect evidence that the Japanese are highly risk aversive. Firstly 
heterogeneity in risk-averse behavior has recently been reported from the medical or genetical 
point of view. See e.g. Ono et al. (1997) and Nakamura et al. (1997).    Those researches have 
                                                           
8  The estimates of degree of relative risk aversion reported in Szpiro (1986) are as follows: 
                              minimum                mean                maximum 
The U.S.                    1.02                    1.19                      1.41 
Japan                          1.99                    2.76                      4.01. 
9  According to the data on flows of funds published by FRB and the Bank of Japan, households in the U.S. allocate 
about half of their personal financial assets to “risky assets” like equities, but in contrast households in Japan allocate 
only about 10 % of their personal financial assets to risky assets and instead allocate about 60 % of them to “safe 
assets” like deposits and trusts. 
10  As Lucas (1987) argues, the degree of relative risk aversion in the U.S. may be much higher than 1 but less than 
20.   20 
shown that the genetic composition of the receptor for brain chemicals such as serotonin or 
dopamine differs widely among human races. They also show that most Japanese have inherited 
a certain type of receptor composition that produces more cautious and therefore more risk 
aversive characteristics, while many Americans have inherited the other type that produces less 
risk  aversive  characteristics.
11  These  recent  results  from  medical  researches  strengthen  the 
appropriateness of the results from past researches on estimation of degree of risk aversion. 
          Secondly,  Harashima (1998) shows  that the so-called  “Japanese  economic  system”  or 
“Japanese  capitalism”  originates in  the  higher  degree  of  risk  aversion  in the  Japanese. The 
“Japanese economic system” can be regarded as a society with less open-minded convention in 
which relatively longer-term relationships within agents who are well-known each other, e.g. 
Keiretsu, are established and unknown agents are evaded. If the degree of risk aversion is higher, 
people will prefer maintaining the status quo to challenging new relationships, and thus existing 
relationships will continue relatively longer periods. 
In  sum,  we  can  at  least  conclude  that  the  Japanese  are  more  cautious  and  have  the 
relatively  higher  degree  of  risk  aversion  compared  to  the  American,  although  the  absolute 
values of degree of relative risk aversion in both countries are still inconclusive. The fact that 
two  non-small  countries  have  heterogeneous  degrees  of  relative  risk  aversion  is  important, 
because the mechanism of trade imbalances shown in the paper may have worked between the 
U.S. and Japan.   
 
2. Impacts on trade balances 
The magnitude of impacts of heterogeneity in risk aversion on trade balances depends on 
                                                           
11  More precisely, the conclusions of Ono et al. (1997) and Nakamura et al. (1997) are as follows. There are two 
genetic types of serotonin transporter (5HTT): s-type and l-type. A person who inherits s-type tends to feel anxiety 
more and becomes more risk aversive. According to Ono et al. (1997), most Japanese have inherited only s-type and 
very few have l-type, but few Americans have inherited only s-type and over 30% have inherited only l-type.     21 
parameter values, and which country experiences current account deficits is also determined by 
parameter values. In this sub-section, simple simulations with calibrated parameter values are 
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The  limit  of  consumption  growth  rate 
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.  Thereby,  with  the  appropriate  calibrated 
parameters, i.e. the degrees of relative risk aversion in both countries  1 and  2, the rate of time 
preference  , the rate of depreciation rate  , the share of labor inputs  , and the output/capital 























∞ → ∞ → =  












∞ → ∞ → =   can  be 
calculated by equation (13).   
          Here, the typical calibrated values of the deep parameters such that  05 . 0 =   ,  05 0    = , 
6 0    =   and the capital/output ratio is 3 are selected.
12  The estimates of the limit of the balance 

























∞ → ∞ → =   for three combinations of  1 and  2, i.e., (a)  1 2 2 1       = , 
(b)  1 2 5 1       = , and (c)  1 2 0 . 2     = , are shown in Table. 
                                                           
12  The values are roughly same as those used for the calibration of the U.S. economy in Cooley and Prescott (1995).   22 
          The results make lucid some important features of the model. Firstly, if  1 is less than 3 in 
the cases of (a) and (b) and less than 2 in the case of (c), the country 1 experiences a permanent 
current account surplus, however, if  1 is 3 or more than 3 in the cases of (a) and (b) and 2 or 
more than 2 in the case of (c), the country 1 experiences a permanent current account deficits. 
Hence,  whether  the  country  1  experiences  a  permanent  current  account  surplus  or  deficit 
depends on the absolute value of the degree of relative risk aversion, which was predicted by 
proposition 3. In other words, there is a possibility that a country with relatively lower degree of 
relative risk aversion experiences a permanent current account deficit. 
            Secondly, several combinations of  1 and  2 result in unrealistic consequences: firstly, if 
the difference between  1 and  2 is large, e.g. the case of (c), accumulated balances on current 
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   τ τ
,  which  was  predicted  by 
corollary 2, and secondly, if  1 is small, e.g.  1 is 3 or less than 3 in the cases of (a), the growth 
rate of consumption is unrealistically high. As a result, realistic results are observed in cases that 
 1 is more than 6 in the cases of (a) and (b). However, even in these cases, the magnitude of 
trade imbalance is several percent of GDP and thus larger than actually observed data, i.e., 
roughly 1 % of GDP (see figure 2). Hence, although the model shows a theoretical possibility of 
a permanent current account deficit, quantitatively the model may need some modifications to 
fit more closely with the actual data. 
There are several possibilities that may solve this quantitative problem. Firstly, because 
there are many other factors that have influence on the trade balance and thus the observed 
actual data are the mix of effects of these many factors, there is a possibility that effects of 
heterogeneous degree of relative risk aversion are mostly canceled out by effects of other factors. 
Secondly, there is a possibility that the international financial market is not necessarily well   23 
integrated  as  the  Feldstein-Horioka  puzzle  indicates.
13  In  this  situation,  the  volume  of 
international financial transactions will be much smaller than that predicted in the model and 
thus  trade  imbalances  will  also  be  much  smaller.  Thirdly,  there  is  a  possibility  that  the 
difference of degree of relative risk aversion between the U.S. and Japan is not so large, e.g. that 
in Japan is 1.05 times that in the U.S. Hence trade imbalances may be much smaller because the 
model predicts that as the difference of degree of relative risk aversion becomes smaller, the 
trade imbalance becomes smaller. Fourthly, there is a possibility that there are other significant 
heterogeneities in deep parameters than the degree of relative risk aversion between the U.S. 
and Japan. 
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The large current account deficit in the U.S. and the large current account surplus in 
Japan have continued during the past three decade, and the large bilateral trade deficit of the U.S. 
with Japan has also persisted. The conventional intertemporal approach to the current account 
can not explain these persisting large current account imbalances as Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) 
note, and thus it needs the help of overlapping-generations variants of the intertemporal models 
with  heterogeneous  demographic  changes.  However,  the  conjecture  that  current  account 
imbalances are generated by heterogeneous demographic changes has not been fully supported 
by  empirical  evidence  and  is  still  merely  a  theoretical  possibility.  The  paper  explores 
heterogeneity in degree of risk aversion as another possible source of persistent current account 
imbalances. The reason why the paper directs its attention to the degree of risk aversion is that 
in endogenous growth models the degree of relative risk aversion plays a crucial role for growth 
rates,  and  thus  its  heterogeneity  significantly  complicates  movements  of  international 
                                                           
13  See Feldstein and Horioka (1980).   24 
transactions. Another reason is because it has been reported that the degree  of relative risk 
aversion in Japan is relatively higher than that in the U.S., which implies a possibility that the 
large current account deficits in the U.S. and the large current account surpluses in Japan can be 
explained by the relatively higher degree of relative risk aversion in Japan than that in the U.S.   
The model in the paper, which is based on the solution in Sorger (2002) and Ghiglino 
(2002) to the problem of heterogeneous households raised by Becker (1980), shows that the 
heterogeneity in degree of risk aversion generates persistent, more correctly permanent, current 
account imbalances. In some circumstances, a country with relatively lower degree of relative 
risk aversion experiences a permanent current account deficit, and in reverse a country with 
relatively  higher  degree  of  relative  risk  aversion  experiences  a  permanent  current  account 
surplus. Nevertheless, current account deficits and surpluses do not explode but the ratios of 
deficits and surpluses to output asymptotically approach unique finite values and stabilize in 
both countries. 
          Hence, the model predicts that if the degree of relative risk aversion in Japan is truly 
relatively higher than that in the U.S., there is a possibility that the current account surplus 
persists in Japan permanently and the current account deficit persists in the U.S. permanently. 
The results of simple simulations with calibrated parameter values indicate that a country with 
relatively lower degree of relative risk aversion experience a permanent current account deficit 
for some combinations of degrees of relative risk aversion. However, the results also indicates 
that the magnitude of trade imbalance is larger than actually observed data, and thus although 
the model shows a possibility of a permanent current account deficit, quantitatively the model 
may  need  some  modifications  to  fit  more  closely  with  the  actual  data.  There  are  several 
possibilities  that  may  solve  this  quantitative  problem:  1)  a  possibility  that  effects  of 
heterogeneous degree of relative risk aversion are mostly canceled out by effects of other factors, 
2) a possibility that the international financial market is not necessarily well integrated as the 
Feldstein-Horioka puzzle indicates, 3) a possibility that the difference of degree of relative risk   25 
aversion between the U.S and Japan is not so large, and 4) a possibility that there are other 
significant heterogeneities in deep parameters than the degree of relative risk aversion between 
the U.S. and Japan. 
          Finally, the mechanism of trade imbalances presented in the paper of course does not 
deny the possibility of trade imbalances caused by heterogeneous demographic changes. Both 
mechanisms  have  probably  worked  simultaneously.  Furthermore,  there  may  be  other 
heterogeneous parameters that play important roles for international transactions between other 
countries, e.g. heterogeneous technologies.   
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APPENDIX 
 
1. Proof of lemma 1 
          By the optimality condition (5),   








              
  
 
     
  
 



































− − & , and thus   
( ) ( )
 
   
 
 







   
 
    
   
  
 










































 = ∫ − − &
. 
On the other hand, by the optimality condition (4), 
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          Hence,  the  transversality  conditions  (6)  0 lim 1 1 =
∞ →             and  (10)  0 lim 2 2 =
∞ →             are  not 
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                                                                                                                                    Q.E.D.   
 
2. Proof of lemma 2 
(Step 1) By equations (11) and (12), 
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On the other hand,   
( ) ( )
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∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → = = = =  constant,  then  = = = =
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τ& .  Thus,  by  lemma  1  the  transversality  conditions  (6)  and  (10)  are 































    
  







τ& . Thus by lemma 1, for both 
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∞ → ∞ → ≠ , the 
transversality conditions (6) or (10), or the optimality conditions (5) or (9) is violated. 



























1 lim lim lim lim
& & & &
∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → = = = = constant, all the optimality 
conditions are satisfied. 
                                                                                                                                    Q.E.D. 
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3. Proof of proposition 1 
  (Step  1)  In  this  case,        can  be  seen  as  a  control  variable  for  each  country.  Hence,  the 
optimality condition 




























    
   
  
   
is added to the optimality conditions for the country 1, and the optimality condition   




























    
   
  
   
is added to the optimality conditions for the country 2. The optimality conditions (14) and (15) 
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          On the other hand, by the optimality conditions (14) and (15), 
( ) ( ) 1 1 1
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∞ → =   for the optimality conditions 















∞ → =   for   30 
the optimality conditions (7), (8), (9) and (10) to be satisfied. 
        Here, because the equations such that          2 1 = ,          2 1 =   and          2 1 & & =   are kept by firms 
at any time, the households in the country 2 must set the higher initial consumption level than 
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  and thus the optimality condition (7) or 
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1
1 , and thus the ratio 
of     1 to        diminishes to zero as time passes and the trade balance becomes negligible for the 















∞ → = , thereby it is not 



















































∞ → = = , it is possible for the country 2 to satisfy all the optimality conditions 
by setting appropriate initial values of  10     and  0   . 
                                                                                                                                    Q.E.D. 
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4. Proof of proposition 2 
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∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → ∞ → = = = = = . 
(Step 2) As for     , by equation (16) and 
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                                                                                                                                    Q.E.D. 
 
5. Proof of corollary 1 
By  (step  2)  in  the  proof  of  lemma  2, 
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positive constant. 
                                                                                                                                    Q.E.D. 
 
6. Proof of proposition 3 















∞ → ∞ → = , then by equations (11) and (12),   
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2 1   =  a  positive 
constant. 

















      
 






& = a positive constant. Hence, for sufficiently   33 
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& & &   by corollary 1, 
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          Therefore  if  2 1 1     < ≤ and  if  ( ) ( )  
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=  a  negative  constant  and 
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                                                                                                                                    Q.E.D. 
 
7. Proof of corollary 2 
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Hence, if  ( ) ( ) ( )    
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8. Proof of corollary 3 

































   
    


















   


































   


























= a negative constant. 
                                                                                                                                    Q.E.D. 
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Table 
(a)  1 2 ε ε 2 1  =  
                                                                                                                                                     
       1           2,                   
 
 






                 
 
 
















                     
                                                                                                                                         
      1.0        1.2                      0.21                            0.10                          0.16 
      2.0        2.4                      0.11                            0.30                          0.93 
      3.0        3.6                      0.071                        -0.36                          -1.68 
      4.0        4.8                      0.053                        -0.11                          -0.70 
      5.0        6.0                      0.042                        -0.066                        -0.52 
      6.0        7.2                      0.035                        -0.047                        -0.44 
      7.0        8.4                      0.030                        -0.036                        -0.40 
      8.0        9.6                      0.027                        -0.030                        -0.37 
      9.0      10.8                      0.024                        -0.025                        -0.35 
10.0      12.0                      0.021                        -0.022                        -0.34 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
(b)  1 2 ε ε 5 1  =  
                                                                                                                                                     
       1           2,                   
 
 






                 
 
 
















                     
                                                                                                                                         
      1.0          1.5                      0.19                            0.25                          0.45 
      2.0          3.0                      0.093                          1.31                          4.67 
      3.0          4.5                      0.062                        -0.41                          -2.21 
      4.0          6.0                      0.047                        -0.18                          -1.27 
      5.0          7.5                      0.037                        -0.11                          -1.01 
      6.0          9.0                      0.031                        -0.083                        -0.89 
      7.0        10.5                      0.027                        -0.066                        -0.82 
      8.0        12.0                      0.023                        -0.054                        -0.78 
      9.0        13.5                      0.021                        -0.046                        -0.75 
10.0        15.0                      0.019                        -0.040                        -0.72 
                                                                                                                                                         42 
 
(c)  1 2 ε ε 0 . 2 =  
                                                                                                                                                     
       1           2,                   
 
 






                 
 
 
















                     
                                                                                                                                         
      1.0          2.0                      0.16                            0.50                  1.08                             
      2.0          4.0                      0.078                        -3.27                        -14.00                             
      3.0          6.0                      0.052                        -0.38                          -2.47                               
      4.0          8.0                      0.039                        -0.20                          -1.75                               
      5.0        10.0                      0.031                        -0.14                          -1.49                               
      6.0        12.0                      0.026                        -0.11                          -1.35                             
      7.0        14.0                      0.022                        -0.085                        -1.27                             
      8.0        16.0                      0.019                        -0.071                        -1.22                             
      9.0        18.0                      0.017                        -0.061                        -1.18                             
10.0        20.0                      0.016                        -0.054                        -1.15                             
                                                                                                                                                       
 